

FOMC Preview — The Dovish Hike Redux?

The two-day meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee starts Tuesday and culminates in Wednesday's 2pmET statement and Summary of Economic Projections by FOMC members followed by Chair Yellen's press conference at 2:30pmET. We are among the unanimous 75 forecasters within Bloomberg's consensus that expect the Fed to hike by 25bps, taking the fed funds target range to 0.5-0.75%. Fed fund futures remain 100% priced for a hike. To not hike would arguably risk doing more damage through negative signaling or higher inflation expectations. A cautious balance is likely to be struck on the bias and on that issue there is more of a difference of opinion across markets in a fair debate. I think there is a solid case for a dovish hike that leans against market forces that risk short-circuiting further dual mandate progress.

At the same time, it is highly premature to expect the Fed to materially change its outlook in response to the US election. The Fed's data dependence by definition restrains it to waiting for hard evidence on how an as-yet uncertain mixture of potential shifts in fiscal, regulatory, trade and broader foreign relations policies may impact the dual mandate and market stability. That will take a considerable amount of time over next year and beyond.

If the Fed doesn't lean against bond and currency markets then watch out, we're in for greater curve steepening into the new year and a stronger dollar. That could raise the odds of greater caution at future meetings. The broad trade-weighted dollar index is at a 15 year high and the 30 year mortgage rate has climbed by almost three quarters of a percentage point over the past couple of months. Trade (chart 1) and housing markets face downside risk. As argued [here](#), the economic pain arrives first in the "Trump trade" before uncertain net gains to possible future fiscal, trade and regulatory policy actions that markets are probably overestimating. It's not all about Trump, however, in that the USD has been swinging higher since 2014 and yields were rising several weeks ahead of the election for global reasons. Some of this is because of improved fundamentals, some is an overshoot, and some is thanks to actions of other global central banks.


There are many ways in which the Fed could resist the urge to join the party or invoke an incrementally more dovish bias. I'm probably only thinking of a few, but it's entirely possible that it does so using any one of its main tools on game day — or a combination.

- Language:** They could flag tightened financial conditions in either nuanced or explicit ways. They could shift language to how real wage growth is under downward pressure (chart 2). They could also reference uncertain effects of potential fiscal and other policy shifts on the dual mandate with some forms being inflationary and some not. They could maintain reference to unchanged — if not falling — survey-based measures of inflation expectations and downplay market-based readings that have simply caught up (chart 3). Tilting away from balanced near-term growth risks toward downside risks is a possibility.
- Dots:** The FOMC could choose to leave the median pace of projected hikes unchanged or even lower it; either would signal caution relative to market enthusiasm. Recall that the last dots forecast two hikes in 2017 and three in each of 2018 & 2019. Two year Treasury yields have doubled since July and that may be too much too soon.

CONTACTS

Derek Holt
416.863.7707
Scotiabank Economics
derek.holt@scotiabank.com

Chart 1



Source: Scotiabank Economics, Federal Reserve, Bloomberg.


Chart 2



Source: Scotiabank Economics, U.S. BLS.

3. **Macro forecasts:** The FOMC could only tweak forecasts by marginally downgrading 2016 GDP growth and PCE inflation and marginally upgrading them for 2017-18 if at all.
4. **Press conference:** Especially if the FOMC's dots don't inject caution, Chair Yellen might do so with a buck-stops-here approach that makes it clearer what the top of the house is thinking. This raises the prospect of a second trade centred on the press conference. She might dwell upon the dollar and bond markets doing too much of the Fed's work too soon. She could discuss the evidence on fiscal multiplier effects and uncertain consequences to growth. She could argue they cannot act in anticipation of other policy levers versus waiting for action to show up in data-dependent fashion and how this will take considerable time to evaluate while resurrecting reference to a patient approach. She could also warn of the consequences to protectionism.

Chart 3



This report has been prepared by Scotiabank Economics as a resource for the clients of Scotiabank. Opinions, estimates and projections contained herein are our own as of the date hereof and are subject to change without notice. The information and opinions contained herein have been compiled or arrived at from sources believed reliable but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to their accuracy or completeness. Neither Scotiabank nor any of its officers, directors, partners, employees or affiliates accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this report or its contents.

These reports are provided to you for informational purposes only. This report is not, and is not construed as, an offer to sell or solicitation of any offer to buy any financial instrument, nor shall this report be construed as an opinion as to whether you should enter into any swap or trading strategy involving a swap or any other transaction. The information contained in this report is not intended to be, and does not constitute, a recommendation of a swap or trading strategy involving a swap within the meaning of U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation 23.434 and Appendix A thereto. This material is not intended to be individually tailored to your needs or characteristics and should not be viewed as a "call to action" or suggestion that you enter into a swap or trading strategy involving a swap or any other transaction. Scotiabank may engage in transactions in a manner inconsistent with the views discussed this report and may have positions, or be in the process of acquiring or disposing of positions, referred to in this report.

Scotiabank, its affiliates and any of their respective officers, directors and employees may from time to time take positions in currencies, act as managers, co-managers or underwriters of a public offering or act as principals or agents, deal in, own or act as market makers or advisors, brokers or commercial and/or investment bankers in relation to securities or related derivatives. As a result of these actions, Scotiabank may receive remuneration. All Scotiabank products and services are subject to the terms of applicable agreements and local regulations. Officers, directors and employees of Scotiabank and its affiliates may serve as directors of corporations.

Any securities discussed in this report may not be suitable for all investors. Scotiabank recommends that investors independently evaluate any issuer and security discussed in this report, and consult with any advisors they deem necessary prior to making any investment.

This report and all information, opinions and conclusions contained in it are protected by copyright. This information may not be reproduced without the prior express written consent of Scotiabank.

™ Trademark of The Bank of Nova Scotia. Used under license, where applicable.

Scotiabank, together with "Global Banking and Markets", is a marketing name for the global corporate and investment banking and capital markets businesses of The Bank of Nova Scotia and certain of its affiliates in the countries where they operate, including, Scotiabanc Inc.; Citadel Hill Advisors L.L.C.; The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company of New York; Scotiabank Europe plc; Scotiabank (Ireland) Limited; Scotiabank Inverlat S.A., Institución de Banca Múltiple, Scotia Inverlat Casa de Bolsa S.A. de C.V., Scotia Inverlat Derivados S.A. de C.V. – all members of the Scotiabank group and authorized users of the Scotiabank mark. The Bank of Nova Scotia is incorporated in Canada with limited liability and is authorised and regulated by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada. The Bank of Nova Scotia is authorised by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the UK Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of The Bank of Nova Scotia's regulation by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority are available from us on request. Scotiabank Europe plc is authorised by the UK Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority and the UK Prudential Regulation Authority.

Scotiabank Inverlat, S.A., Scotia Inverlat Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., and Scotia Derivados, S.A. de C.V., are each authorized and regulated by the Mexican financial authorities.

Not all products and services are offered in all jurisdictions. Services described are available in jurisdictions where permitted by law.